Will China Overtake the U.S. Economy by 2035? A Deep-Dive into the Global Power Shift

The question reverberates in boardrooms and policy circles worldwide: can People’s Republic of China (China) overtake United States of America (U.S.) in economic size by 2035? And if so, what are the implications for the global power balance? In this piece, we’ll dissect what the major forecasts say, explore growth drivers and headwinds for each economy, and assess whether 2035 is a realistic horizon for such a shift—or simply a dramatic headline.

1. Setting the Scene: Where we stand today

Before looking ahead, we need to understand the baseline.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s April 2025 World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, China’s nominal GDP is about US$19.23 trillion and the U.S. about US$30.51 trillion, leaving China a sizable gap. 

On the growth side, recent projections show China’s real-GDP growth slowing: the World Bank projects China’s growth to slow to about 4.8 % in 2024 from 5.2 % in 2023. For 2025-26, growth is projected around 4.2 %-4.5 %. 

For the U.S., the IMF’s April 2025 WEO shows advanced-economy real-GDP growth at about 1.4 % (over a horizon) and for emerging markets 3.7 % in 2025. 

On the China side: The World Bank notes structural headwinds—demographics, productivity, a property sector slump. 

In short: China remains on a higher growth trajectory than the U.S., but growth is decelerating—and the gap in GDP size is still large.

2. Forecasts and “2035” as a Milestone

Now: what do forecasters say about the possibility of China surpassing the U.S., and is 2035 a realistic date?

Key Forecasts

A widely cited projection: The former IMF deputy chief Zhu Min (now at a Chinese think-tank) said in 2023 that if China grows around 4 %-4.5 % and the U.S. around 2 %-2.5 %, China could overtake the U.S. by early to mid 2030s—2035 being a plausible mark. 

Private-sector forecast: Goldman Sachs’s “The Path to 2075” (2022) flagged that China might overtake the U.S. around 2035—about a decade later than earlier estimates. 

More cautious view: A recent analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2024) says that at projected rates (China down to ~3 % by 2029, U.S. tracking at lower but stable levels), China likely won’t surpass the U.S. until around 2050, if then. 

What the forecasts imply

Putting these together:

If China were to average ~4.5 % growth annually while the U.S. averaged ~2 % between now and 2035, the gap might close enough for China to conceivably pass the U.S.

But many analysts downgrade China’s growth potential to 3%-4% annually over the medium term—given structural headwinds.

Meanwhile, the U.S. may also maintain moderate growth, potentially delaying or even preventing a clear pass-over.

So: “2035” remains widely cited, but under optimistic assumptions. Under more realistic ones, “mid-2030s” slips to “late 2030s or beyond.”

3. Drivers of China’s Rise – And Question Marks

Why many believe China has a shot—and where the “ifs” lie.

Growth drivers

Catch-up potential: China still has income per capita far below the U.S., meaning scope to increase productivity and close the gap. This catch-up dynamic historically allows faster growth in emerging economies. 

Scale and market size: With a population of ~1.4 billion and massive domestic market, China benefits from large-scale manufacturing, infrastructure, innovation push.

Government policy push: China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and goals for 2035 envisage a shift toward higher-value manufacturing, services, green tech, and domestic consumption. 

Emerging headwinds

Demographics: China’s working-age population has peaked and will shrink, reducing labour-force growth. 

Productivity plateau: Several analysts say China’s “easy gains” (urbanisation, industrialisation) are behind it. The incremental productivity gain may slow. 

Debt and property issues: The property sector slump and local-government debt pose risks for China’s growth model. 

External headwinds: Geopolitical friction (trade/tech), supply-chain decoupling, tariffs—these risk reducing China’s export momentum. 

In short: China has strong structural advantages, but growth is conditioned on navigating significant long-term risks.

4. The U.S. Economy: Resilience, Risks, and Why It Matters

Turning the lens onto the U.S.: overtaking depends not only on China rising, but also on the U.S. performance.

Strengths that favour the U.S.

Innovation ecosystem: The U.S. remains the global leader in many cutting-edge sectors (software, AI, biotech). That matters for productivity and future growth.

Institutional depth: Strong institutions, rule of law, capital markets give the U.S. an edge in resilience and adaptation.

Structural flexibility: The U.S. economy is increasingly services-oriented, which can be less volatile than heavy reliance on manufacturing.

Vulnerabilities

Low growth baseline: The advanced-economy real‐GDP growth is trending lower; IMF data show ~1.4 % for advanced economies in 2025. 

Fiscal deficits and debt: Overhanging fiscal burdens could constrain future growth or require higher taxation/borrowing. 

Global headwinds: Trade tensions, supply‐chain disruptions, geopolitics weigh on U.S. export and investment prospects.

Why U.S. growth matters for the China-vs-U.S. race

Even if China were to grow faster, if the U.S. growth does not slow down dramatically, the gap remains wider for longer. As the Carnegie report notes: “If China grows more slowly than forecasted, it will not surpass the United States unless U.S. growth also badly stalls.” 

5. Putting it together: Is 2035 realistic? My verdict

After mapping the drivers and forecasts, here's an evaluative summary:

Scenario analysis

Base (moderate) case: China averages ~4 % annual growth, U.S. ~2 % → China closes the gap but likely only overtakes the U.S. in size around late 2030s or early 2040s.

Optimistic case: China averages ~4.5-5 % annual growth, U.S. stuck at ~1.5-2 % → Overtake by around 2035 feasible (consistent with Zhu Min’s back-of-envelope).

Pessimistic case: China growth slips below ~4 % because of structural constraints; U.S. growth surprises upward. Overtake delayed well beyond 2035—or may never happen in relative terms.

Key verdict

Yes, 2035 could be the year China overtakes the U.S.—but only under favourable assumptions of sustained relatively high growth from China and subdued growth from the U.S. More likely the timetable slips: I lean toward 2038-2042 as a more probable overtaking window (if at all).

It’s also critical to remember: “overtaking” in nominal GDP does not equal parity in global power, living standards, or geopolitical clout.

6. Implications of a Power-Shift

What would this mean if China does surpass the U.S. in GDP size by (or around) 2035?

Global economic order: China’s ascendancy would accelerate redistribution of global economic influence—more trade, investment, and policy weight shifting to Asia.

Geopolitics and strategic competition: The U.S. may feel challenged across finance, technology, military, diplomacy. China may push more actively for a global governance role aligned with its interests.

Global value chains: China further embeds itself as a manufacturing and consumption centre; non-China markets (e.g., India, Southeast Asia) may play bigger roles.

Domestic focus: For both countries, the race highlights the importance of productivity, human-capital, innovation, and structural reform rather than just headline GDP growth figures.

7. Conclusion: More than a numbers game

In the “China vs U.S. economy” debate, the 2035 marker is a headline‐catcher—but the real story is deeper.

China’s rise is substantial and will continue to reshape the global economy. But structural headwinds—demographics, debt, productivity, international friction—mean the pace may be slower than early throwaway forecasts suggested. Meanwhile the U.S., though facing its own constraints, retains resilience. Over-turning the global economic order is about trajectory more than moment.

For the investor, policymaker or student of the global economy: the takeaway is not just “when will China pass the U.S. in GDP size?” but “how are both economies changing, what quality of growth will each sustain, and how will the global system adapt?”

In short: keep an eye on 2035—but pay even closer attention to the growth path through the 2030s.